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Abstract 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship existing among prices of alcoholic 
beverages, alcohol consumption and traffic fatalities for the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities during the time interval 1998-2002. Among the main results, we highlight a 
positive correlation between alcohol consumption and traffic mortality rate. Basically, 
governments implement two kinds of policies to reduce the traffic mortality rate. One is 
oriented to control the supply of alcohol by increasing alcohol taxes. The other is oriented to 
preserve traffic security, increasing the number of sanctions for traffic rule infraction. We find 
evidence that both policies exert a positive influence in the reduction of traffic fatalities. There 
is no empirical evidence to indicate that being a novice driver increases the tendency to be 
involved in a mortal traffic accident. 
Keywords: Alcohol Consumption, Traffic Accidents, Fatalities, Traffic Measures, Alcohol 
Taxes. 
JEL Classification: C3, H2, I1, R4. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traffic accidents have become one of the most serious health problems of modern 
societies due to the number of deaths and handicaps that this kind of accident generates. Road 
fatalities are influenced by the quality and kind of vehicle used for transportation, so for 
instance, the repercussions of a traffic accident in which motorcycles are involved are usually 
more dangerous for the individual than those traffic accidents in which cars are implicated 
(Scuffham, 2003; Smith, 1999). The quality and coverage of the vehicle helps undoubtedly to 
reduce the impact of the accidents, however in traffic accidents in which excess speed and/or 
alcohol abuse are present, the security systems of the vehicles serve for little. In fact, these are 
the two most frequent reasons for traffic accidents (Spanish General Directorate of Traffic, 
2004). 
The Spanish General Directorat  of Traffic (2005) estimates that in Spain there are 
around 3,000 mortal traffic accidents per year which cause the death of 5,000 people. With 
data provided from the Spanish General Directorate of Traffic, a Spanish newspaper 
highlights that: “more than 30% of traffic accidents during 2004 involved drivers who 
presented a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) over the legal level” (see Spanish newspaper El 
País, December 07, 2005). The magnitude of this problem is so severe that for example drunk 
drivers are directly responsible for one in four deaths among young males aged from 15 to 29 
(Spanish National Anti-Drug Campaign, 2001)1.
One of the main contributions accomplished by the economic analysis perspective in 
the research of alcohol consumption lies in the fact that if we only consider present monetary 
 
1 In all these statistical numbers a distinction could not be made between traffic fatalities caused by the driver’s 
own fault (e.g. death of drunk driver) or those caused by someone else’s fault (e.g. drunk drivers kills other 
person). From the report of the Spanish General Directorate of Traffic (2005), we conclude that to analyse drunk 
driving, it is important to know the number of drivers who drove under the influence of alcohol, and the number 
of people who died as a consequence of having been involved in a traffic accident independently whether the 
person who died caused the traffic accident or not. So unless the contrary is said, the number of victims refers to 
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prices of alcoholic beverages, we are undervaluing the real cost of alcohol consumption. Next 
to the monetary dimension, problems derived from alcohol abuse should be valued (accidents, 
health problems or social conflicts, among others). The costs that alcohol drinkers impose on 
themselves and the people who surround them are the foremost reason why alcoholic 
beverages, except wine2, are burdened with special indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are 
transferred integrally to the final price of the product, so only consumers pay the tax. One of 
the governmental justifications of a price increase is to make consumers aware of the real 
costs related to alcohol consumption. This argument is particularly relevant to drinking where 
there are serious short and long term dangers. Not everybody values these potential costs in 
the same way; in fact, young people tend to give them less importance because they have less 
money than adults (Grossman et al., 1993). This differential sensibility means that if the final 
price of alcoholic beverages increases, their consequences will be higher for youth. Thus 
abusive alcohol consumption is promoted by the fact that the prices that consumers pay are 
lower than marginal social costs of alcohol consumption; it is necessary to increase the taxes 
on alcoholic beverages until the consumer realizes about the real cost of drinking alcohol 
(Phelps, 1988). Cook (1988) supports this argument, if and only if abusive alcohol 
consumption and its corresponding costs were sensitive to the price of alcoholic beverages. 
Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the relationship between alcohol consumption and 
its negative consequences, so policy makers can foresee how an increase in the taxation of 
alcoholic beverages reduces alcohol consumption. In fact the scientific literature about the 
effectiveness of alcohol taxation for the reduction of traffic fatalities has been increasing in 
the last years (Cook and Tauchen, 1984; Dee, 1999; Dee et al., 2005; Grossman et al., 1993;
Mast et al., 1999; Ruhm, 1995 and 1996; Saffer and Grossman, 1987; Young and Bielinska-
 
the total number of people who died as a consequence of having been involved in a traffic accident in which the 
driver presented a BAC higher than that permitted. 
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Kwapisz, 2006; Young and Likens, 2000). Nevertheless we fail to notice empirical evidence 
under a European context, so our main contribution lies in providing the first empirical 
estimations for Spain.  
As a starting point we study some basic statistics that provide us with a preliminary 
glimpse of the problem. In Table 1, we show the numbers and percentage of traffic fatalities 
(and deaths) with respect to population for Spanish Autonomous Communities for the time 
period 1996-2002. From Table 1, we appreciate that there are around 5,000 traffic fatalities 
per year. In relative terms, we appreciate that between one and two deaths in 100 are derived 
from traffic accidents and one person from 10,000 citizens dies because of traffic accidents. 
The communities with a higher percentage of traffic fatalities with respect to population and 
total number of deaths are Aragon, Castilla-León, Galicia, Murcia, Rioja and Navarra. In 
contrast, Cantabria and Madrid are the regions with the lowest percentages. With regard to the 
temporal evolution, we observe that the number of traffic fatalities with respect to the total 
number of deaths increases in all Autonomous Communities during the time interval 
considered, being specially high up to the year 2000. This increase of traffic fatalities is a 
problem that worries the Spanish Society and Public Institutions. 
(Insert Table 1) 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship existing among alcohol 
consumption, prices of alcoholic beverages and traffic accidents in Spain. In particular, we 
focus on investigating the effectiveness of diverse economic policies (alcohol taxes) and 
traffic policies (sanctions) that are applied with the purpose of reducing the number of traffic 
fatalities. The most important contribution of this paper lies in its being the first economical 
analysis that goes deeply into the relationship between drinking and driving for the Spanish 
 
2 Wine products have been exempt from special indirect taxes to protect the competitiveness of European wine 
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case. Economic theory states that alcohol consumption is negatively correlated with the price 
of alcoholic beverages, so an increase in these prices, ceteris paribus, reduces alcohol 
consumption, and consequently, the number of traffic fatalities. Therefore, the hypothesis we 
want to verify is: 
Alcohol Prices  Alcohol Consumption  Traffic Fatalities. 
To that end, we define a theoretical model that combines theories of addiction and 
crime. For the empirical analysis, we have drawn data from Consumption Household Survey 
(Spanish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing); Survey of Deaths by Cause and 
Harmonized Consumption Index (Spanish National Institute of Statistics); Statistic Yearbook 
about Labor Issues (Spanish Labor Ministry) and Statistic Yearbook (General Directorate of 
Traffic). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the previous 
theoretical and empirical researches. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical model. In Section 
4 we detail the empirical framework and database. In Section 5 we explain the results of the 
estimations. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the main conclusions and we suggest 
corresponding policy implications. 
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
In previous papers, authors analyze the determinants of traffic accidents, paying 
special attention to the effects of traffic sanctions, alcohol consumption and alcohol taxes. The 
main argumentation line establishes that offences committed by individuals are negatively 
correlated with their costs. So offences can be defined as a function of the probability of being 
arrested and punished, as well as the severity of the punishment. Several empirical studies 
 
industry. However the European Commission has been debating the adequacy of this exemption. 
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have demonstrated that harder traffic sanctions contribute to increasing the cost of the offence 
of driving under the influence of alcohol, so this kind of traffic offence will experience a 
reduction, and therefore, traffic fatalities will be reduced too (Young and Likens, 2000). Other 
empirical studies question the effectiveness of harder sanctions because of two main reasons: 
an incorrect transmission of new penalties so that a population group remains unaware of the 
latest sanctions, and the laxness of present penalties. For that reason, it is necessary to 
increase the penalties until they reach their real social costs (Kenkel, 1993a; Kenkel and 
Koch, 2001). Next to penalization, the probability of being arrested plays an outstanding role 
in the reduction of drinking and driving (Benson et al., 1999). 
Although drunk driving may seem irrational, it is not wrong to model the co-joint 
decision of drinking and then driving under the structure of rational theories. The models in 
which individuals maximize their utilities are applicable to criminal behaviour, which 
includes driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages (Becker, 1968). In fact, there is 
strong empirical evidence about the positive link between alcohol consumption and the 
number of traffic accidents. Among priority measures that should be implemented, we 
underline the reduction of alcohol abuse. In fact, most governments frequently recur to 
increasing alcohol taxes which raises the final price of alcoholic beverages, and consequently, 
reduces alcohol demand as the acquisition capacity is restrained (Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz, 2006). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of policies centred on tax increases is under 
debate. Whereas it is an efficient policy for some authors (Benson et al.,2000; Ruhm, 1995 
and 1996; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002), for others, tax effects are limited due to the 
existence of fixed spatial effects3 (Dee, 1999; Mast et al., 1999) or due to the occurrence of 
measurement errors at the time of calculating alcohol prices (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 
 
3 These papers have analyzed the traffic accidents in USA where the fixed spatial effects are related to the 
different States. 
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2003), or even due to the presence of alcohol consumption in early stages of life (Sloan et al.,
1994). 
With the goal of postponing the age at which young people start their experience with 
alcoholic beverages, the minimum legal age for buying alcoholic beverages has been 
frequently raised. Making access to alcoholic beverages more difficult for youth will reduce 
the tendency of drunk driving for at least this population group (Cook and Tauchen, 1984). 
However, this idea is questioned by Asch and Levy (1987), who concede greater importance 
to the experiences of driving and drinking than to the minimum legal age for buying alcoholic 
beverages. 
Lastly, there are authors who, although they recognize the impact of alcoholic 
consumption over the number of traffic accidents, also suggest improving vehicle security to 
reduce traffic mortality rates, such as for example, controlling the use of seat belts or helmets 
(Sen, 2001). 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL 
To define the theoretical model we take as a starting point the article of Mast et al.
(1999), in which the number of deaths by traffic accidents4 ( R ) depends on drunk driving 
offences ( D ) and a vector that includes measures of traffic such as new expedited driving 
licenses, that is, the number of people with newly acquired driving licenses (T ): 
( )ttt TDRR ,= (1) 
The main problem with equation (1) is that D is not observable, so there is no data 
available for drunk driving. To solve the maximization problem, we focus on the pattern that 
 
4 The number of deaths by traffic accidents reflects the total number of people who died as a consequence of 
having been involved in a traffic accident independent of  whether they provoked it or not.  
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defines drunk driving. The function that explains driving under the influence of alcohol (D) 
includes alcohol consumption (C ), and expected punishment for drunk driving. The 
punishment is determined by the probabilities of being arrested and fined ( F ), and by the 
punishment severity ( S ): 
( )tttt SFCDD ,,= (2) 
We just substitute the D expression in (1) 
( )ttttt TSFCRR ,,,= (3) 
where C is determined by a Marshallian demand function which takes into account the 
additive characteristics of tolerance and reinforcement (Becker and Murphy 1988)5:
( )IPPPCC tttt ,,, 11 += (4) 
I represents initial wealth and total life incomes valued at the initial moment and tP is the 
price of alcoholic beverages for the moment of time t. If alcohol consumption depends on the 
present, past and future prices of alcoholic beverages, then the individual takes decisions 
rationally because at the moment of deciding how much to drink, past alcohol consumption 
determines present demand and present consumption affects future demand. If alcohol 
consumption depends exclusively on the present and past prices of alcoholic beverages, then 
the individual takes decisions myopically, because current consumption is independent of 
 
5 The modelling of traffic accidents as a function of alcohol consumption, equation (3), is not exempt of 
weaknesses. For instance, whether alcohol consumption increases the probability of a traffic accident depends 
on: when the alcohol is consumed (just before driving); where the alcohol is consumed (e.g. at home or away 
from home, with dinner); and how much alcohol is consumed in a short period of time. So two people, or two 
regions or two countries, can have the same amount of alcohol consumption, but very different levels of traffic 
risk. Regularly drinking a glass of wine with dinner may not be a problem; drinking 7 glasses of beer on a Friday 
night could cause a drunk driving accident. 
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future consumption and/or future events. The main difference between rational and myopic 
points of view is that the latter is entirely backward-looking (Becker et al., 1994). 
Models of drunk driving characterized by an economic perspective tend to emphasize 
the impact of alcohol taxes on the crime prevalence versus police efforts to combat drunk 
driving. Benson et al. (2000) show that police can indeed deter drunk-driving by using 
aggregated data that includes variables such as drug arrests, property arrest and violent arrest. 
To measure the probability of being arrested, we will introduce the annual number of traffic 
sanctions registered by the policy. 
For the North-American society, there are more complex models that consider the 
influence of other variables, for instance legislative, in the process of utility maximization. 
This complexity is derived from the fact that the diverse States are self-ruling to implement 
health and traffic public policies (Benson et al., 2000; Dee et al., 2005; Kenkel et al., 2001;
Morrisey and Grabowski, 2005; Pacula 1998). Kenkel and Koch (2001) highlight that new 
state laws will be effective in the deterrence of drunk driving, only if people know about 
them. In fact, although new state laws have been implemented and their efficiency is under 
question, there is evidence of rational behaviour given the lack of knowledge of these laws 
among citizens. 
For the empirical application of the Spanish case (1998-2002), there have not been 
substantial legislative changes. Concerning alcohol issues, the minimum legal age for buying 
alcoholic beverages has been increased from 16 to 18 years in most of the Autonomous 
Communities. The Spanish Autonomous Communities are self-governing to determine the 
minimum legal age for the purchase of alcoholic beverages, so the rise of this legal age has 
taken place in different communities at different times. For example, Catalonia and Navarre 
were the first communities to adopt this policy in 1991, whereas Aragon and Rioja were some 
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of the last ones to adopt the policy in 2001. Nevertheless, we do not introduce this policy 
measure in our model, because it is necessary to be at least 18 years old to have access to a 
driver’s license. Concerning traffic measures in Spain, one of the main legal changes has been 
to reduce the allowed BAC from 0.8 grams per litre in 1992 (Royal Decree 13/1.992, of 
January 17) to 0.5 grams per litre in 2003 (Royal Decree 1428/2003, of November 21). So 
only when we have available data of traffic accidents for the year 2003 and after, will it be 
possible to analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Concerning traffic sanctions, there are four 
legislative documents (Legislative Royal Decree 339/1.990, of March 2; Law 5/1997, of 
March 24; Law 19/2001, of December 19; Law 17/2005, of July 19) in which the character of 
driving is established with higher levels of the legal BAC (serious infraction and very serious 
infraction since 2001) and the monetary and non monetary penalties (maximum 600 Euros). 
We observe that the infraction of drunk driving is redefined from serious to very serious, but 
the monetary penalty is scarcely raised by 2 Euros from the Legislative Royal Decree of 1990 
and the Law of 2001, thus we consider that the offender faces the same sanction along the 
studied period of time. According to this argumentation line the variable S keeps constant 
along the period 1998-2002, so we will introduce it under the constant term to avoid problems 
of multicollineality. Once we have obtained the optimal consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
we will translate the result into the following function to obtain the rate of traffic fatalities: 
( )tttt TPCRR ,,= (5) 
from which we will analyze the impact of alcohol consumption, traffic sanctions and the rest 
of traffic measures in the formation of the rate related to traffic fatalities. The empirical results 
will confirm if a lower demand of alcoholic beverages reduces the mortality rate by traffic 
accidents. 
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4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND VARIABLES 
Regarding to the empirical model, we will structure the estimations in two stages. In 
the first stage, we will think about the determinants of alcohol consumption per capita. 
Among these determinants we draw attention to the price of alcoholic beverages for the 
present, past and future time periods, individual incomes and dummy variables that 
summarize fixed temporal and spatial effects. In a second stage, we will define the rate of 
traffic fatalities as a function of alcohol consumption, the number of traffic sanctions (proxy 
variable of sanctions and traffic measures) and the attainment of a new driving license. In 
addition, we introduce dummy variables to introduce fixed effects related to the different 
Autonomous Communities and time periods6 in both stages. So equations (4) and (5) will 
adopt the following formulations: 
ititit wZC += 	 i=1,2,…18; t=1998,…2002. (6) 
itititit vXCR ++= 
 i=1,2,…18; t=1998,…2002 (7) 
where Cit represents the consumption of alcohol per capita for the Autonomous Community i
for the year t; Rit is the rate of traffic fatalities; Xit and Zit are matrices of explicative variables; 

, and 	 are vectors of parameters; wit, and vit are residuals which summarize the unobserved 
aspects that influence both alcohol consumption and traffic fatalities. For instance, the 
residual of the equation of traffic fatalities will include human failure or weather conditions, 
among others. 
 
6 The mortality rate of traffic fatalities is the best empirical approximation to analyze the relationship between 
alcohol consumption and traffic fatalities (Young and Likens, 2000; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz 
,2006).Although all traffic accidents are not the result of drunk driving, there is a strong correlation between both 
variables. 
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The most common specification7 of the dependent variable Rit in the equation of the 
mortality rate (7) consists in a logistic transformation of this variable. That is, if rit is obtained 
for the Autonomous Community i as the number of deaths in traffic accidents divided by the 
Community population for each year t, then the dependent variable in the regression is 
( )( )ititit rrR = 1 . One advantage of this transformation lies in that it restrains the foresee 
values of the mortality rate to 0 and 1. 
We also assume that unobservable components that influence traffic fatalities may be 
unique for each Autonomous Community and constant over time. Additionally, there may 
also be specific unobservable aspects for each year8. Thus the residual in equation (7) should 
be transcribed as vit=i+t+it; where i represents the unobservable fixed effects for each 
Autonomous Community, t the fixed effect for each year and it the error term whose 
variance is constant and uncorrelated with observable and unobservable characteristics for the 
Autonomous Communities through time. The same argumentation line may be translated to 
the unobservable aspects that influence the alcohol consumption, so the residual in equation 
(6) should be transcribed as wit=i+t+it, where i is the specific unobservable component for 
each Autonomous Community, t the fixed effect for each year and it the error term whose 
variance is constant and uncorrelated with observable and unobservable characteristics 
through time. The specific unobservable fixed effects for each Community and year are 
summarized under dummy variables for each Community and year. 
Concerning the estimation method, we will take into account the following 
distinctions. We estimate equation (6) applying OLS, thus the right hand of the equation only 
contains exogenous variables (Z) and additionally these variables are not correlated with the 
 
7 Other useful specification lies in the Linear Regression Models. Young and Likens (2000) compare the results 
of both specifications (linear and logistic) finding just small differences. We have also carried out estimations 
from both specifications concluding that the results are very similar. Results are available on request. 
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residual wit, so all assumptions of the classic OLS are satisfied. Regarding equation (7), we 
highlight that the endogenous variable C is introduced as an explicative variable next to the 
rest of the independent variables that configure X. Under these circumstances, OLS can also 
be implemented, only if, C were not correlated with the residual vit. To find out whether there 
is correlation or not, we carry out two tests: the endogeneity, or simultaneity, test of Hausman 
(1978) and the Augmented Test Regression, also known as Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) of 
Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) also based on the asymptotic requirement of the Hausman 
test9. The results of both tests are presented in Table 2, in which the first column is devoted to 
the Hausman test and the second, to the DWH test. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity, thus alcohol consumption is an exogenous variable in equation (7). In the way 
that the alcohol consumption variable is not correlated with the residual, the OLS estimators 
are consistent and asymptotically efficient. In summary, the two-equation-system is recursive, 
so we will estimate two independent equations by OLS because it is not necessary to apply the 
methodology of simultaneous equations (Greene, 2003, section 15.5.1). 
(Insert Table 2) 
Lastly, due to the small number of observations (90 observations corresponding to 18 
Autonomous Communities for the time interval 1998-2002) we also test if the estimated 
parameters might be biased by a problem of heteroskedasticity. Once we checked and rejected 
the possibility of heteroskedasticity10, we continued with the presentation of the results by 
using OLS. 
The database has been self-elaborated by using information drawn from the 
Consumption Household Survey (Spanish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing); Survey 
 
8 Both assumptions are recurrent in the literature; see for example the articles of Mast et. al (1999), Young and 
Likens (2000) and Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006). 
9 The Augmented Test Regression and Hausman Test are included in the software package Stata 9.0. More 
information about these tests is available in: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/endogeneity.html.
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of Deaths by Cause and Harmonized Consumption Indexes (Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics); Statistic Yearbook about Labor Issues (Spanish Labor Ministry) and the Statistic 
Yearbook (General Directorate of Traffic).  
(Insert Table 3) 
Table 3, contains the mean and standard deviation of each variable, which have been 
classified by sources. The period of time considered is from 1998 to 2002. Regarding the 
variables related to consumption and acquisition capacity, we observe that on average an 
individual demands 53.56 Kg. of alcoholic beverages per year, and the labour cost per capita 
is 1,313.932 Euros per month. The Price Index of Consumption (CPI) is, with an index of 
108.580, superior to the corresponding past CPI (105.205) and lower than the corresponding 
future CPI (109.001). Concerning traffic conditions, there were 133 traffic sanctions for every 
1000 citizens, and on the other hand, a new driving license A or A1 was expedited for every 
1000 citizens. Regarding geographical distribution, 27.8% of the observations are for 
Autonomous Communities that reside in the North, 22.2% for Communities allocated in the 
Center, 16.7% for Communities placed in the South and East, 11.1% for the Islands and the 
remaining 5.6% for Madrid.  
One of the peculiarities of the model is that we focus on the previous number of 
sanctions instead of the present number of traffic sanctions, so the variable is retarded one 
period11.
10 To check the presence of heteroskedasticity we carry out the test of White and the test of Breuch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisburg which are also available in the software package Stata 9.0. Both test results are algebraically identical 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
11 The temporal interdependency of alcohol consumption derived from the Addiction Theory (Becker and 
Murphy, 1988) postpones the effect of public policies, thus the individual requires a period of time to adjust to 
the new changes in the parameters that define alcohol consumption (McKenzie, 1991). 
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5. RESULTS. 
We will keep the sequence defined in the theoretical framework for the presentation of 
the results. Thus, we start with the estimation of alcohol consumption under rational and 
myopic addition. Both equations differ from each other only in the introduction of the future 
price of alcoholic beverages .To that end, we have repeated the estimations by OLS twice, in 
order to know if the pattern of alcohol consumption is defined as rational or myopic. Then we 
will continue with the estimation of traffic mortality rate. 
Table 4, contains estimation results for alcohol consumption according to the theories 
of rational addiction and myopic addiction. In this table, we observe that the lagged price of 
alcoholic beverages is negatively correlated to the present alcohol consumptions. Thus, an 
increase of 1% in the lagged price of alcohol reduces alcohol consumption by 0.61%. This 
value is within the range of price elasticities for aggregate alcohol consumption estimated in 
previous work (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2003, 2006). Furthermore, if for instance the 
individual foresees a 1% increase in the future price of alcoholic beverages, he/she will tend 
to increase his/her present alcohol consumption in a 0.17%, but we have to be cautious with 
this affirmation because the estimated parameter is not statistically significant. In addition to 
the lack of significance of future alcohol price, we observe that although the adjusted 
coefficient of determination is slightly higher for the myopic model (and the Akaike info 
criterion slightly lower), we can not strongly affirm that the pattern of alcohol consumption 
for the Spanish society behaves myopically rather than rationally. 
(Insert Table 4) 
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Concerning other monetary variables, we observe that higher available budgets 
promote higher demand for alcoholic beverages. So, for instance, an increase of a 1% increase 
in the monthly income12 raises the demand for alcohol by 0.53%. per year. 
In relation to spatial and temporal effects, we observe that alcohol consumption per 
capita is higher in all areas in relation to Madrid, with the higher marginal effect for those 
regions allocated in the South followed by the North and East. On the other hand, alcohol 
consumption experienced the highest marginal effect increase in 1999 in relation to 2001, 
while during 2000 and 2002, alcohol consumption experienced a reduction. Nevertheless, the 
effects of these last two dummy variables are not statistically significant. 
Once having analyzed the demand of alcoholic beverages, we proceed with the 
presentation of the results related to traffic fatalities in Table 5 using two different 
specifications for equation (7). Model 1, includes alcohol consumption as regressor and 
Model 2 repeats again the estimation of traffic mortality rate but this time, including as a 
regressor, the price of beer. In Model 1 we appreciate that higher traffic control, measured by 
the lagged number of traffic sanctions registered by police, is negatively correlated with the 
rate of traffic fatalities, so for example an increase in traffic sanctions13 by 10% reduces the 
rate of traffic fatalities by 0.34%. So, a higher public expenditure allocated in stronger traffic 
control will have a positive effect in the reduction of traffic fatalities. 
(Insert Table 5) 
Another determinant, cited recurrently as a source of traffic accidents, is the lack of 
driving experience; therefore we introduce a variable that informs us about the number of new 
drivers in each Autonomous Community. Contrary to what we would have expected, this 
 
12 We have recurred also to the Gross National Product (GNP) with which we have obtained similar estimations 
to that described in the present paper. 
13 The variable related to traffic sanctions informs us of the number of sanctions expedited by the Policy as a 
consequence of traffic controls. 
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population group does not increase the tendency to suffer a traffic accident, which we analyze 
as deriving from two facts. Novice drivers have lower speed limits during the first year, and 
lower legal BAC for the first two years14. In fact, an increase of 10% new drivers reduces the 
rate of traffic fatalities by 0.23%.  
By region, we observe that coherent with the alcohol consumption levels, the rate of 
traffic fatalities is higher for all areas with respect to Madrid. Nevertheless, the Communities 
allocated in the South and the Islands have the highest mortality rate. 
But undoubtedly, the most interesting result is the one that confirms that higher 
alcohol consumption per capita increases the rate of traffic fatalities. So an increase of alcohol 
demand by 1% provokes an increase of 0.305% in the number of traffic fatalities. This result, 
next to the fact that an increase in the lagged price of alcoholic beverages reduces the present 
demand of alcohol, allows us to affirm that an increase in the price of alcoholic beverages 
reduces the rate of traffic fatalities. By definition, the elasticity fatalities with respect to the 
price of alcohol, Efp,is equal to the product of the price-consumption elasticity, Ecp, and the 
consumption-fatality elasticity, Efc. This implies that the price-fatality elasticity is 
Efp=0.615*0.305=0.1870.19. So an increase of the lagged alcohol price in 1% reduces the 
number of traffic fatalities by 0.19%. This is the first paper that calculates the price-fatality 
elasticity for the particular case of a European country; however this magnitude has already 
been obtained for the North-American society. Thus, the relationship between alcohol price 
and number of traffic fatalities is also negative and the absolute value of the price-fatality 
elasticity falls in a range of 0.5 to 1.0 in USA (Kenkel, 1993; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz 
2006). 
 
14 Novice drivers are not allowed to drive with BAC higher than 0.3 for the first two years (Royal Decree 
1428/2003, of November 21). 
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Lastly, we repeat again the estimation of traffic mortality rate but this time including 
as a regressor the price of beer (Model 2). The reason why we introduce the beer price is to 
observe the influence of an increase in the price of a particular alcoholic beverage on the 
number of traffic fatalities (Young and Likens, 2000; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2006). 
At the same time, as we failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of alcohol 
consumption (previously mentioned in page 13), so to confirm this hypothesis is important to 
consider the statistical power of the test. If the instrumental variables are not very strong, the 
Hausman test is weak and will fail to reject exogeneity. In order to carry out a robustness test, 
we estimate the reduced form, Model 2, where consequently the potentially endogenous 
variable (alcohol consumption) has been replaced with an exogenous determinant of alcohol 
consumption, that is, the price of beer. According to the price-fatality elasticity, we conclude 
that if the tax applied to beer increases in 10%, the rate of traffic fatalities will drop by 6.9%, 
which is the result of multiplying the increase in the price of the beer as a consequence of the 
tax increase15 by the price elasticity of Model 2 in Table 5. Furthermore, we observe that the 
parameter of the beer price is strongly accepted under a significance level of 5%, so we do not 
have any signal that the Hausman test is weak. 
Once our theoretical model has been validated for both general price of alcoholic 
beverages and the price of a particular alcoholic beverage, it is reasonable to support the 
strategy of incrementing alcohol taxes in order to reduce their negative externalities. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Although the consumption of legal drugs, such as alcoholic beverages, is not 
considered as pernicious as the consumption of illegal ones, the real situation is that alcohol 
 
15 Alcohol taxes are fully passed through to final prices (Kenkel, 2005). Taking into account that the Spanish tax 
rate applied to beer is around 16.75% of the final price (including all indirect taxes, that is VAT and special tax), 
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consumption promotes serious health problems. One of the main contributions of this paper 
lies in being the first economic analysis that demonstrates the positive relationship between 
alcohol consumption and the number of traffic fatalities for the Spanish case. Drug control 
and prevention has become mainly a responsibility of governments which usually restrain 
their policies to market regularization (Reuter, 1988). Due to the fact that taxes are the most 
applied public policy instrument for reducing alcohol abuse, we have analyzed the 
effectiveness of a price increase. Next to economic policies, we have also introduced traffic 
measures such as a higher traffic control through an increase in the number of traffic 
sanctions. The empirical evidence validates our main hypotheses: an increase in alcohol prices 
reduces alcohol consumption, and consequently, the number of traffic fatalities. On the other 
hand, a higher number of traffic sanctions reduces the rate of deaths by traffic accidents. In 
the way that a higher number of traffic sanctions has a positive influence, it is surprising that 
economical sanctions have been kept constant since their introduction (max. 600 Euros), and 
considering the serious magnitude of the negative externalities of drunk driving, this monetary 
penalty can even be considered quite indulgent. 
Although governments can rarely hope to reduce risks to zero, they can aim to lower 
them to a more acceptable level, and to explain, through open communication with the public, 
why and how they are doing so. On the one hand, there is a global tendency towards 
increasing taxes in order to limit alcohol consumption, while on the other hand some domestic 
production is being protected. For example, the tax harmonization process of the European 
Union reveals that Mediterranean countries tend to apply lower tax rates to wine as opposed to 
alcoholic beverages, and furthermore, wine producers receive subsidies from the European 
Commission to help them compete with countries outside the European Union. There is a 
debate about the justification for these policies. In particular, Eastern-European countries, 
 
an increase by 10% of the beer taxes will increase the final price of the beer by more or less 9.4% (Law 37/1992 
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which have recently joined the European Union, are requesting the same privileges for their 
beer industry that is currently granted to the wine sector. In order to avoid domestic subsidies, 
an alternative approach is to impose import taxes. For example, this is the way the USA has 
protected their local wine industry. 
On the other hand, one of the main sources of public income is tax collection. Because 
the demand for alcoholic beverages tends to behave as inelastic, an increase in the 
corresponding taxes might be more beneficial in terms of increasing public revenue than in 
terms of reducing alcohol abuse. 
In addition, these economic and traffic measures are not the only ones that promote 
welfare, the policy makers have a wide range of possibilities, such as promoting healthy 
leisure activities as an alternative to alcohol consumption. So although decisive steps have 
been implemented in the fight against alcohol abuse and drunk driving, the magnitude of these 
policies is still uncertain, such as for example a decrease in the BAC. It is also worthy to draw 
attention to alternative actions such as the removal of driving licenses in the case of risky 
driving. 
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of December 29 and Law 38/1992 of December 28). (See Table 6)
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Table 1. Deaths and traffic fatalities in Spain.
Number of deaths and percentage with respect to population Number of traffic fatalities and percentage with respect topopulation
Percentage of traffic fatalities
with respect to total number
of deaths
1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002
N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % % % % %
Andalusia 59,562 0.82 61,619 0.84 32,520 0.44 62,697 0.83 920 0.01 1005 0.01 856 0.01 858 0.01 1.54 1.63 2.63 1.37
Aragon 12,480 1.04 13,002 1.09 6,740 0.56 12,985 1.06 156 0.01 213 0.02 219 0.02 190 0.02 1.25 1.64 3.25 1.46
Asturias 12,156 1.11 12,259 1.12 6,359 0.59 12,424 1.14 166 0.02 159 0.01 177 0.02 134 0.01 1.37 1.3 2.78 1.08
Balers 6,789 0.88 7,079 0.88 3,839 4.34 7,114 0.77 117 0.02 114 0.01 137 0.01 108 0.01 1.72 1.61 3.57 1.52
Canaries 11,046 0.68 11,724 0.71 6,663 0.39 11,863 0.64 183 0.01 212 0.01 212 0.01 136 0.01 1.66 1.81 3.18 1.15
Cantabria 5,189 0.97 5,167 0.97 2,761 0.52 5,278 0.96 52 0.01 74 0.01 62 0.01 53 0.01 1 1.43 2.25 1
Castilla-Leon 25,118 0.99 25,970 1.03 13,649 0.55 26,349 1.05 469 0.02 421 0.02 444 0.02 435 0.02 1.87 1.62 3.25 1.65
Castilla-Mancha 16,832 0.97 17,141 0.99 8,624 0.49 17,577 0.98 234 0.01 244 0.01 272 0.02 248 0.01 1.39 1.42 3.15 1.41
Catalonia 54,036 0.88 56,052 0.9 29,235 0.46 57,862 0.88 756 0.01 881 0.01 925 0.01 811 0.01 1.4 1.57 3.16 1.4
Valencia 35,928 0.89 36,383 0.9 19,320 0.47 38,023 0.87 579 0.01 640 0.02 595 0.01 569 0.01 1.61 1.76 3.08 1.5
Extremadura 10,508 0.97 10,623 0.98 5,405 0.5 10,549 0.97 144 0.01 148 0.01 156 0.01 132 0.01 1.37 1.39 2.89 1.25
Galicia 28,879 1.04 28,103 1.02 14,716 0.54 28,353 1.03 610 0.02 641 0.02 563 0.02 495 0.02 2.11 2.28 3.83 1.75
Madrid 36,804 0.73 37,711 0.74 19,615 0.38 39,281 0.71 446 0.01 461 0.01 452 0.01 417 0.01 1.21 1.22 2.3 1.06
Murcia 8,581 0.78 9,060 0.81 4,860 0.42 9,441 0.76 153 0.01 201 0.02 212 0.02 194 0.02 1.78 2.22 4.36 2.05
Navarre 4,690 0.89 4,816 0.9 2,589 0.47 4,989 0.87 84 0.02 100 0.02 102 0.02 76 0.01 1.79 2.08 3.94 1.52
Basque Country 18,035 0.85 18,153 0.86 9,802 0.46 18,627 0.88 271 0.01 314 0.01 304 0.01 269 0.01 1.5 1.73 3.1 1.44
Rioja 2,549 0.95 2,588 0.97 1,388 0.52 2,634 0.93 39 0.01 61 0.02 49 0.02 59 0.02 1.53 2.36 3.53 2.24
Total 349,182 0.88 357,450 0.89 160,257 0.4 366,046 0.87 5,379 0.01 5,889 0.01 5,688 0.01 5,183 0.01 1.54 1.65 3.55 1.42
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Table 2. Endogeneity test for the variable alcohol consumption in the equation (7) 
Hausman Test DWH Test 
Index of Mortality 2(1 degree of freedom) 
(significance level) 
F-snedecor value (1,48) 
(significance level) 
Whole Survey: 
Rational addiction 
1.28 
(0.257) 
1,29 
(0,261) 
Whole Survey: 
Myopic addiction 
0.76 
(0.383) 
0,76 
(0,388) 
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Table 3. Variables and descriptive statistics (1998-2002).  
Variables Description Mean (S. Deviation)
Survey of Deaths by Cause, Spanish National Institute of Statistics 
Yit=RFT Rate of traffic fatalities (logistic transformation) by Autonomous Communities. 0.016 
(0.03) 
Statistic Yearbook about Labor Issues, Spanish Labor Ministry 
INCOMEDF Labor cost per worker by Autonomous Communities. (in Euros deflated to 2001) 1313.932 
 (157.777) 
Consumption Household Survey, Spanish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing 
CA Annual alcohol consumption per capita (Kg.) by Autonomous Communities. The 
quantities have been corrected by ethanol content (by 1 beer; 2 
wine/champagne/cider; 8 strong liquors). 
53.560 
 (14.910) 
BEERPRICE Average price of beer in Euros per kg. by Autonomous Communities. 1.155 
(0.097) 
Statistic Yearbook, General Directorate of Traffic 
SANCTION(t-1) Number of traffic sanctions by Autonomous Communities for the period t-1 
(numbers in thousand). 
133.650 
(179.099) 
NDA Number of novice drivers type A and A1 (every 1000 citizens) by Autonomous 
Communities for the period t. 
0.927 
(1.656) 
CPI, Spanish National Institute of Statistics 
CPIA Present harmonized CPI of alcoholic beverages by Autonomous Communities. 108.580 
(19.539) 
CPIA(t-1) Lagged harmonized CPI of alcoholic beverages by Autonomous Communities. 105.205 
(19.903) 
CPIA(t+1) Future harmonized CPI of alcoholic beverages by Autonomous Communities. 109.001 
(15.366) 
SPATIAL DUMMY VARIABLES 
NORTH Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the North (Asturias, Cantabria, Galicia, 
Navarre and Basque Country), 0 otherwise. 
0.278 
(0.450) 
SOUTH Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the South (Andalucia, Murcia, Ceuta and 
Melilla), 0 otherwise. 
0.167 
(0.375) 
EAST Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the East (Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia), 0 
otherwise. 
0.167 
(0.375) 
CENTER Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the Center (C. Mancha, C. Leon, Extremadura 
and Rioja), 0 otherwise. 
0.222 
(0.418) 
ISLANDS Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the Islands (Balers and Canaries), 0 otherwise. 
0.111 
(0.316) 
MADRID Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is related to an 
Autonomous Community placed in the Madrid, 0 otherwise. 
0.056 
(0.230) 
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Table 4. Estimation of alcohol consumption.
RATIONAL ADDICTION MYOPIC ADDICTION
Coefficient S. Deviation Sign. Elasticity Coefficient S. Deviation Sign. Elasticity
CPIA 0.0153 0.0124 0.3097 0.0214 0.0096 ** 0.4311
CPIA(t-1) -0.0312 0.0092 *** -0.6096 -0.0315 0.0092 *** -0.6150
CPIA(t+1) 0.0082 0.0105 0.1667 - - -
INCOMEDF 0.0021 0.0008 *** 0.5255 0.0022 0.0008 *** 0.5317
NORTH 1.3181 0.4598 *** 0.0724 1.3323 0.4582 *** 0.0732
SOUTH 1.4784 0.5781 *** 0.0325 1.4871 0.5765 *** 0.0327
EAST 1.3146 0.4929 *** 0.0433 1.3205 0.4915 *** 0.0435
CENTER 0.8601 0.5471 0.0378 0.8765 0.5452 0.0385
ISLANDS 0.9267 0.5663 * 0.0204 0.9359 0.5647 * 0.0206
MADRID a) - - - - - -
YEAR 2002 0.5053 0.4141 0.0189 0.6355 0.378 * 0.0237
YEAR 2001a) - - - - - -
YEAR 2000 -0.0152 0.3594 -0.0006 0.1724 0.2666 0.0064
YEAR 1999 2.8487 0.3445 *** 0.1064 3.0124 0.2726 *** 0.1125
YEAR 1998 0.1384 0.3626 0.0052 0.3048 0.2925 0.0114
INTERCEPT 1.455 1.4523 1.552 1.443
F-Snedecor
(Prob)
18.78 (0.00) 20.41 (0.00)
R2 (corrected) 0.7335 0.7349
R2 0.7747 0.7728
Akaike info
criterion
2.4639 2.4490
Note: *** indicates individual significance at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
- Reference variable in a)
- The dependent variable Alcohol Consumption has been divided by 10.
- The elasticity terms have been calculated from the marginal effect using the routine in STATA9.0 named “mfx”. The
elasticity terms have been evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
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Table 5. Estimation of the rate of traffic fatalities.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient S. Deviation Sign. Elasticity Coefficient S. Deviation Sign. Elasticity
ALCOHOL
CONSUMPTION 0.0009 0.0004 ** 0.3052
- -
BEER PRICE
- - -0.0109 0.0054 ** -0.7488
SANCTION(t-1)
-0.0004 0.0002 * -0.0342 -0.0005 0.0002 ** -0.0411
NDA
-0.0005 0.0002 ** -0.0234 -0.0004 0.0002 * -0.0207
NORTH
0.0043 0.0016 *** 0.0711 0.0054 0.0016 *** 0.0881
SOUTH
0.0076 0.0017 *** 0.0511 0.0068 0.0018 *** 0.0459
EAST
0.0046 0.0016 *** 0.0533 0.0047 0.0016 *** 0.0540
CENTER
0.0043 0.0016 *** 0.0619 0.0032 0.0016 ** 0.0464
ISLANDS
0.0056 0.0017 *** 0.0375 0.0059 0.0017 *** 0.0397
MADRID a) - - - - - -
CONSTANTE
0.0093 0.0023 *** 0.0259 0.0064 ***
Note: See Table 4. The estimation also includes dummy year variables. The SANCTION (t-1) variable has been divided by 100.
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Table 6. Prices and taxes of beer. 
Tax increase (10%) 
Region 
Price 
before 
taxes 
(Euros) 
Taxes 
(%) 
Price 
after 
taxes 
(Euros) 
Taxes 
(%) 
Price after taxes 
(Euros) 
Price increase 
(%) 
Andalucia 0.12 16.81 2.27 18.49 2.48 9.44 
Aragon  0.14 16.70 2.61 18.37 2.86 9.43 
Asturias  0.14 16.69 2.63 18.35 2.88 9.43 
The Balearic Islands 0.14 16.72 2.53 18.39 2.77 9.43 
The Canary Islands 0.15 16.68 2.67 18.34 2.92 9.43 
Cantabria 0.15 16.68 2.65 18.34 2.90 9.43 
C. Mancha 0.12 16.80 2.28 18.48 2.50 9.44 
C. Leon 0.13 16.78 2.35 18.45 2.57 9.44 
Catalonia 0.14 16.72 2.54 18.39 2.78 9.43 
Valencia  0.12 16.81 2.25 18.49 2.46 9.44 
Extremadura 0.14 16.72 2.53 18.39 2.77 9.43 
Galicia  0.14 16.71 2.56 18.38 2.80 9.43 
Madrid  0.14 16.72 2.51 18.39 2.74 9.43 
Murcia  0.13 16.78 2.33 18.45 2.55 9.44 
Navarra 0.14 16.71 2.57 18.38 2.82 9.43 
The Basque Country 0.15 16.67 2.72 18.33 2.98 9.43 
Rioja 0.12 16.81 2.25 18.49 2.46 9.44 
Source: Consumption Household Survey, Spanish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing (2000). 
 Average price of a beer (33 cc.) acquired in a supermarket. 
 Law 37/1992 of December 29 and Law 38/1992 of December 28.  
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